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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
WESTERN CAPITAL AND
SECURITIES, INC.,

)
)
)
)

PETITION FOR A
WRIT OF CERTIORARI

vs.

)

CASE NO:

HELEN KNUDSVIG,

)

Respondent,

Petitioner.

)

(CATEGORY NO. 14)

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
POINT I.

Whether a violation of Federal Securities Law

can be raised as a mandatory counterclaim in a State Court
action.
POINT II. Whether

a

violation

of

Securities

Dealers

Rules gives rise to a federal question or a state court
action.
GROUNDS FOR JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to Utah
Code Annotated §78-2-2(3)(a) and Rule 43 of the Rules of the
Utah Supreme Court.
was

entered

The decision of the Court of Appeals

on February

7, 1989, and

a thirty

(30) day

extension was granted by this Court March 8, 1989.
STATEMENT OF THE CA)SE
That

the

Petitioner

is

a

61 year

old

lady who has

habitually dabbled in penny stocks, usually in the amount of

1

a few hundred dollars or less, investing in new issues which
would hopefully achieve a quick

rise in value.

(T. 399)

The Respondent attempted to establish that the Petitioner
was an experienced and sophisticated investor, but this is'
contrary to the facts.

(T. 555)

In 1984 the Petitioner

bought $200.00 worth of penny stocks in a company known as
Venture Consolidated, which amounted at that time to 20,000
shares.

The particular stock was a new issue and a typical

penny stock offering and the corporation Respondent was the
market maker of the issue in any market which would follow.
(T. 506, 517 and 549)

The plan was to sell 100 million

shares and insiders eventually captured 23% of the actual
200,000 plus shares which were sold while the public holding
was to remain at 200,000.

(T. 506, 517, 518 and 549)

The investment was to be held in cash with the plan to
be that at a shareholders meeting a merger and consolidation
with

several

other

corporations

would

be

made

with

the

resulting entity to be known as Tires, Inc., authorizing a
20

to

1

reverse

thereafter.

stock

split,

taking

place

immediately

The particular shareholders meeting to occur on

September 19, 1984.

(T. 531, 532}

In the meantime, Venture

Consolidated stock rose from one cent (1<) to sixteen cents
(160) or seventeen cents (170), the sole reason for the rise

2

being

the proposed

merger

and

the

general

activities of the Respondent brokerage*
600)

market

making

(T-. 531, 532, 577,

The result of the activities of the Respondent and

others with the consistent rise in value of Venture Consolidated and eventually Tires, Inc. stock.

It resulted in the

Petitionees original $200.00 investment being worth approximately $30,000.00 and at the time of trial based again upon
the

general

brokerage

market

making

and/or other

activities

insiders

of

activity.

the

Respondent

(T. 531, 571,

592-600)
That

the

Respondent

had

at

all

times maintained

an

Ogden office with an account executive in that office by the
name of Lou Babcock who was well acquainted with the Respondent.

(T. 461-471, 557)

That Mr. Babcock visited with the

Petitioner on September

14, 1984, and advised her of the

stock's recent climb in value and offered to sell it for
her,

(T. 467)

and

that

such

a

sale would

bring

on

the

recording an additional indication of an increase of fixed
value for the market making activity and would serve also to
pick up the stock in the face of what appeared to be high
promotional

activity

in

order

to

prevent

profit

taking

before the explosion in value which was about to occur.
531,

532, 571)

While

the motive

3

to

sell

the

stocks

(T.
on

commission was no doubt present, any such commission would
be very small.
That the Petitioner was
rise

in value

placing

a call

and decided

excited

about

to obtain

to the Respondent's

requesting further information.

the

a second
Salt Lake

(T. 443)

potential
opinion by
office

and

That the broker

who received the call interpreted the conversation to be a
request for sale of shares and that he contacted the vice
president for instructions on how to handle a sale inasmuch
as

there

was

no

stock

brokerage.

(T. 454, 455)

culty,

vice

the

certificate

with

the

Respondent

In spite of the perceived diffi-

president

of

the

brokerage

immediately

approved the sale and the brokerage then made an entry that
the purchase was made for their own market making account.
(T. 451, 452)
That
transaction
Petitioner

the
as

Respondent
required

failed
by

its

to
own

give

notice

agreement

of

the

with

the

in addition to other requirements of SEC rules

and NASD rules.

(T. 404, 459, 471, 435, 505)

That the Petitioner had no intention of making a sale
of her shares and was aware of the fact that such a sale
could not take place without the presence of a stock certificate.

She had in the past had such a sale cancelled as

opposed to having a purchase made by the brokerage to cover

4

what

is known

as a "short

reasons Petitioner

never

sale".

received

(T. 565)

One of the

a stock- certificate

is

that it would serve the personal interest of insiders market
making activity to freeze outsiders and prevent their profit
taking in interference with the stock's rise by making it
more difficult to profit take.
and

the

broker!s

contract

(T. 571)

itself

That regulations

with

the

Petitioner

required a winding up and closing of all transactions within
five (5) days after a sale or purchase occurred,
451, 455)
the

(T. 552,

That the Respondent made no effort to close in

required

five

(5) day period

and

that

they

in

fact

preferred not to do so, preferring instead to await further
developments.

(T. 456-458, 527-529)

That the stock rose uniformly through the next period
of time without any drop below the sales price so that the
brokerage position would not in any way be threatened.
456-458,

527-529)

That

after

approximately

(75) days when the Respondent decided

(T.

seventy-five

to make a transfer

purporting to cover the short, making an entry that they had
bought from their own profit making account.

(T. 5 23)

That this resulted in a paper calculation that if the
sale was made in accordance with the original sales entry,
that a short coverage was effected at the repurchase date
and that the Petitioner would owe the $5,400.00 claimed in

5

Respondent's

Complaint because

market during

the

of the steady

intervening

Respondent's daliance.

seventy-five

rise of the

(75) days

and

That Respondent knew that it would

not be closing within five (5) days, even assuming that the
original sale had actually taken place, and let the matter
ride at the Petitioner's risk and should now be estopped to
make any claim against the Petitioner.
That

the

Respondent

actions strictly

brokerage

(T. 451-459)

made

all

such

trans-

to and from their own market making ac-

counts and records with no threat to their position.
451-459, 523, 524)

(T.

That Petitioner's shares could not be

sold without possession of the certificate.

(T. 452-455)

On appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals made a sua sponte
finding that the Trial Court lacked jurisdiction to hear or
adjudicate any of the issues raised in Petitioner's Counterclaim.
was

The Court found that even though such Counterclaim

a mandatory

Counterclaim,

that it could

matter of violation of Federal

not

raise a

Securities Laws, which

it

found to be reserved exclusively to the Federal Courts.
That at the same time, the Utah Court of Appeals also
found that violation of the NASD Rules governing brokerages
and dealers was also an exclusive Federal question since a
provision
formulation

of
of

the

Federal

such

Securities

rules.

The

6

Utah

Laws

required

Court

of

the

Appeals

therefore denied any damages as awarded by the Trial Court
and found that the Trial Court had no jurisdiction to award
the same.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THIS COURT SHOULD REVIEW BY WRIT OF
CERTIORARI THE DECISION OF THE UTAH
COURT OF APPEALS IF ONE OF THE CONSIDERATIONS OF RULE 43 OF THE RULES OF THE
UTAH SUPREME COURT IS MET.
This Court can review by Writ of Certiorari a decision
of the Utah Court of Appeals when there are special important

reasons

therefore.

Rule

43

lists

categories of what the Court will consider

four

different

in granting a

Writ of Certiorari and the Petitioner believes that three of
the four grounds stated in Rule 43 would apply in this case.
(2)
"When a panel of the Court of
Appeals has decided a question of state
or federal law in a way that is in
conflict with a decision of this court;
(3) When a panel of the Court of
Appeals has rendered a decision that has
so far departed from the accepted and
usual course of judicial procedurings or
has so far sanctioned such a departure
by a lower court as to call for an
exercise
of
this
court's
power
of
supervision; or
(4) When the Court of Appeals has
decided an important question of municipal, state, or federal law which has not
been, but should be, settled by this
court.

7

In this matter, the Utah Court of Appeals denied that a
State Court would have jurisdiction to adjudicate a question
of Federal law even though such question might be found to
be in the nature of a mandatory Counterclaim.

The Petition-

er is unaware of any other rulings of this Court which have
specifically addressed the question and believes it involves
an important question to be resolved.
That such question was raised sua sponte on the part of
the Court of Appeals as it was not raised by either Respondent or Petitioner during the course of that appeal.
Petitioner believes that the decision of the Court of
Appeals is in conflict with this Court's decision

in the

case of Cowen and Co. v. Atlas Stock Transfer Co., 695 P.2d
109 (Utah 1984) , and cases which have interpreted the State
of Utah's version of the Uniform Commercial Code as found in
§§ 70A-8-315 and 70A-8-319 and 70A-8-401.
That at a minimum, the Utah Court of Appeals should
have remanded the matter to the Trial Court to find if any
relief

could

have been granted

question, particularly

based

upon

a State Court

in view of the Court's decision in

Cowen and Co., v. Atlas Stock Transfer Co,, Supra.
That

the

Court

of Appeals

has

decided

an

important

question in the conflict of State and Federal law, which has
not been but should be, settled by this Court as to whether

8

the Courts of this State have the jurisdiction to rule on
questions of Federal Securities laws and whether violation
of

the

rules

of

a particular

exchange

or

brokerage

are

violated gives rise to a Federal or State Court cause of'
action.
The Petitioner would request that this Honorable Court
grant a review by a Writ of Certiorari of the Utah Court of
Appeals case under considerations

(2) , (3) and

(4) as set

forth above.
POINT II.
THAT WHETHER A VIOLATION OF ASSOCIATION
BROKERAGE RULES GIVES RISE TO A QUESTION
OF STATE OR FEDERAL LAW WAS ERRONEOUSLY
DECIDED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS.
The Court of Appeals attempts to make an assumption as
the basis for excluding the Counterclaim of the Petitioner
that

is not

justified by the law.

The Court of Appeals

makes reference to "§ 15a(b)(6) of the Securities Exchange
Act of

1934, 15 USCS

§ 78o-3 (b) - (6) , 1981, as

requiring

securities associations such as NASD to adopt disciplinary
rules.

Even

if this were to be

found

to be

a specific

requirement, it does net give rise to a Federal question.
The Federal Courts are courts of limited

jurisdiction

and their jurisdiction is limited to those areas specifically prescribed by the Constitution and acts of congress.

9

Unless a specific and exclusive granting of jurisdiction is to be found in the Constitution or acts of congress,
there is no jurisdiction on the part of the Federal Courts.
This Court has previously apparently decided a similar
issue on appeal in the case of Cowen and Co. v. Atlas Stock
Transfer Co., 695 P.2d 109 (Utah 1984), but not withstanding
that, the Court of Appeals attempts to say that neither this
Court or any other Court in the State of Utah may adjudicate
or rule upon such issues.

That such a finding on the part

of the Court of Appeals is not justified, particularly in
view of the previous rulings of this Court.
CONCLUSIONS
This Court should grant a Writ of Certiorari based upon
Subsections (2), (3) and (4) of Rule 43 of the Rules of the
Utah Supreme Court to allow this Court to exercise its power
of supervision and to resolve important questions regarding
conflicts between State and Federal law, and questions of
State Court jurisdiction.
DATED this

/S

day of April, 1989.

A

/ '•

A1IA,^H-

•'

.'/ - .'.•' 7

V

7- U"*y*-»'\

GERALD S. WIGHT'
Attorney for Petitioner

10

Recorded Bosk 1

$7]

**• 1296'...",
GERALD S. WIGHT, #3461
VLAHOS & SHARP
Attorney for Defendant
Legal Forum Building
2447 Kiesel Avenue
Ogden, Utah 84401
Telephone: 621-2464

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
WESTERN CAPITAL AND
SECURITIES, INC.,
JUDGMENT
Plaintiff,
-vsHELEN KNUDSVIG,

CIVIL NO: 92290

Defendant.
This matter having come before the Court for trial on
the 16th day of October, 1986, at the hour of 9:30 a.m., the
Court having taken the matter under advisement at the close
of

testimony

and

oral

argument,

and

having

previously

rendered its Memorandum Decision and entered Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law, does hereby award judgment as
follows:
1.

That the Complaint of the Plaintiff is dismissed

no cause of action.
2.
shares

JUDGMENT

That the Defendant is the sole owner of the 2§J$Q
of

Venture

Consolidated

1

which

has

since^

29^>

Recorded Book

i t5 P-

Ke 12.97....
Indexed

converted by the company to 1,000

|

shares of Tires, Inc., and

has been at all times and places in that the Plaintiff has
not and does not have any claim whatsoever on said shares or
against the Defendant.
3.

That the Plaintiff has acted in violation of Rule

10B(5) and 10B(10) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
and the NASD Rules of which the Plaintiff is a member and
has further acted in a manner so as to deceive and cheat the
public in general and the Defendant in particular by its
involvement and hold and control over the subject corporation with the knowledge and inside

information of its

dealings in up coming business activities, and has used all
such to the detriment and damage of the Defendant in attempting

to convert her stock, all in violation of all

applicable rules and regulations thus entitling the Defendant to judgment against the Plaintiff in the amount of
$10,000.00 punitive damage in addition to costs of Court in
the amount of $35.00.
4.

It is further Ordered that Interwest Transfer or

any other entity which has previously been served with or
notified of any restraining order restraining the obtaining
of the certificate by the Defendant shall forthwith release
any such certificate and issue the same to the Defendant
upon appropriate application.

JUDGMENT

2

Recorded BookJL O .i

Pd^e . U 9 S . ..
Indexed

/o
DATED th is / j / day of (Tetter?, 1986.
/

\ BY THE COURT:

HONORABLE JOHN F.//WAHLQUIST
District Court Judge
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this

-^''O0

day of October,

1986, I mailed a true and correct copy of the above and
foregoing JUDGMENT by placing same in the U.S. Mail postage
prepaid and addressed to the following:

Craig F. McCullough
Attorney for Plaintiff
185 South State Street, #528
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

C
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JUDGMENT,

RULES OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

Rule 44

TITLE VI. JURISDICTION ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO COURT OF A P P E A L S .
Rule 42. Review of judgments, orders, and decrees of
Court of Appeals.
^Unless otherwise provided by law, the review of a judgment, an order, and a
decree (herein referred to as "decisions") of the Court of Appeals shall be
fmitiated by a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Utah.
|pcled, effective April 20, 1987.)

Rule 43, Considerations governing review of certiorari.
^Review by a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial discretion, and will be granted only when there are special and important reasons
ftherefor. The following, while neither controlling nor wholly measuring the
court's discretion, indicate the character of reasons that will be considered:
(1) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision in
conflict with a decision of another panel of the Court of Appeals on the
_" same issue of law;
(2) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided a question of
state or federal law in a way that is in conflict with a decision of this
_ r„ court;
iTr" (3) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision that
Vfr has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings or has so far sanctioned such a departure by a lower court as to call
£v for an exercise of this court's power of supervision; or
(4) When the Court of Appeals has decided an important question of
municipal, state, or federal law which has not been, but should be, settled
^,by this court,
dded, effective April 20, 1987.)

f

[Jtule 44. Certification and transmission of record;
parties.

filing;

[a) Appearance, docketing fee, filing, and service. Counsel for the peti>ner shall, within the time provided by Rule 45, pay the certiorari docketing
* and file, with proof of service as provided by Rule 21, ten copies of a
tition which shall comply in all respects with Rule 46. The case then will be
iced on the certiorari docket of the court. Counsel for the petitioner shall
rve four copies of the petition on counsel for each party separately repreited. It shall be the duty of counsel for the petitioner to notify all parties in
s case of the date of filing and of the certiorari docket number of the case,
srvice and notice shall be given as required by Rule 21.
Ob') Joint and separate petitions. Parties interested jointly, severally, or
otherwise in a decision may join m a petition for a writ of certiorari; any one
pfcmore of them may petition separately; or any two or more of them may join
Sp. a petition. When two or more cases are sought to be reviewed on certiorari
End involve identical or closely related questions, it will suffice to file a single
Petition for PJ writ of certiorari covering all the cases

i
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ooOoo
Western Capital and Securities,
Iri2.,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

OPINION
(For Publication)
Case No, 880198-CA

v.
Helen Knudsvig,
Defendant and Respondent.

FILED
F;EB JH989
T. Noonan

CSH^fof ** Court
Second District, Weber County
Utah Court of Appeate
The Honorable John F. Wahlquist
Attorneys: Craig F. McCullough, Salt Lake City, for Appellant
Gerald S. Wight, Ogden, for Respondent

Before Judges Billings, Garff and Jackson.
GARFF, Judge:
Plaintiff and appellant, Western Capital and Securities,
Inc. (Western), filed an action to recover $5,402.20 damages
incurred when defendant and respondent, Helen Knudsvig, failed
or refused to deliver a stock certificate after she allegedly
requested Western to sell stock for her. Knudsvig counterclaimed, alleging that Western had violated Rules 10b-5 and
10b-10 promulgated under § 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange
Act of 1934, and various rules of the National Association of
Securities Dealers (NASD). We affirm in part and reverse in
part.
Western is a broker-dealer registered with the United
States Securities and Exchange Commission and the Utah
Securities Division. Knudsvig is a sixty-one-year-old customer
who occasionally purchased penny stocks through Western and
other brokerage firms. The trial court found that she was not
a sophisticated investor and only traded a few hundred dollars
worth of stock per year.

The conditions in the brokers* contract between Western and
Knudsvig required settlement of all transactions five days
after a sale or purchase. The relevant provisions read:
4. All transactions shall be settled by
the fifth full business day following the
sale or purchase . . . and at your option,
if you shall not have received cash for
the securities purchased for my account or
delivery of the securities sold for my
account, appropriately endorsed and in
proper negotiable form, on the fifth full
business day following the purchase or
sale, as the case may be, you shall have
the right, either with or without demand
upon or notice to me, such demand or
notice being expressly waived, to close my
account, or any trade or transaction
included herein on any such exchange or
market, at public or private sale, or by
public or private purchase, with or
without advertising such sale or purchase,
such advertising being hereby expressly
waived, and such sale or purchase may be
made in one or a series of sales or
purchases as you may elect,
5, You are authorized to accept from me
oral or telephonic orders for the purchase
or sale of securities and in consideration
of your acceptance of this agreement, I
hereby waive any defense that I may have
because any such order was not in writing
or evidenced by a memorandum in writing as
required by the Statute of Frauds, or
other statute.
9. Communications of every kind referring
in any way to my account may be sent to me
at my address given hereon . . . and all
communications so sent, whether by mail,
telegraph, messenger or otherwise, shall
be deemed given to me personally whether
actually received by me or not.
Kim Johnson, secretary/treasurer of Western, testified that
this language meant that, on the fifth business day following

880198-CA

Z

1 ransacticn by buying
iemair, open.

-

• «

v. 'ho control i *•

In about June 19 83, Knudsvig purchased 20/000 shares of
Venture Consolidated/ Inc. (Venture) for $200 through Western
This offering was a new issue of penny stock for which West-,
was a market maker. Knudsvig claimed that she never receive*-:
stock certificate, but had attempted to obtain a duplicate
certificate in August or September of 1983 and also in November
of 1984
,., w~-y . io^ Venture shareholders, approved an acquisition
*:-j .^rger w.th several Big 0 Tire franchises. They changed
the ame of the corporation to Tires, Inc. and approved a 2u
1 reverse stock split* On September , 1984, Louis Babcoek,
Western's Ogden representative, who was
quainted with
Knudsvig through past dealings, notified Knudsvig that
"-»•*, re shares had increased in. value from $.01 to $.1'
, and asked her if she wanted to sell
Knudsvig
_j. tus. Later/ excited about the rise in value of h«=L
she unsuccessfully attempted to contact Babcoek, She then
contacted Western's office in Salt Lake City ...and spoke to
Richard Davis. After a lengthy discussion* Davis concluded
that Knudsvig wanted to sell her stock and wished to credit the
sales commission to Babcoek. While Knudsvig was stil]
telephone, Davis contacted Richard C. Parker, Western's
executive vice president, for instructions on how to consummate
the transaction, which was complicated by Knudsvig*s confusion,
the lack of a stock certificate., and having to credit the
commission to* Babcoek., Parker, in spite of these difficulties,
immediately approved the purchase from Knudsvig for $.16114 per
share through Western's market making account. Davis returned
to the phone, informed Knudsvig of the sale and selling price,
and told her that she had to mail in the stock certificate. He
informed her that it was possible for a trade to take place
without possession of the certificate since she had ten [sic]
days after the trade to bring in the certificate. Parker
stated that the sale was handled .in 'Li uuinner because
Knudsvig was an established, sophistic*-: ••••:] customer who had
paid for and delivered stock :-»•• ^ I i nio: / manner over a long
p p r i or1 o f *-':*- •••

Knudsvig disputes Davis's statements, aiiuouyh hei
testimony is somewhat unclear. Initially, she denied that H :~
phone call ever took, place, bi it then admitted to making the
c-V.''. She denied that she ever requested, the sal<=> of her
'••'•
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stock. She further testified that she had no intention of
making a sale, thought that Western could not sell her stock
without possession of the certificate, and in 1983, Western had
cancelled a similar sale because she could not find her stock
certificate. The trial court found that she had assumed there
could be no final sale until she was able to get a stock
certificate.
Knudsvig stated that, at this point, she was unaware that
her stock had been sold because she never received a written
confirmation of the sale. Western, however, stated that,
within the five day period following the sale, it had sent a
written confirmation to Knudsvig's address. Western did not
close Knudsvig*s account for seventy-five days after the
purported sale, at which time the value of the stock had risen
to $8.00 per share.1 Johnson testified that Western had
waited for this unusually long period of time to cover
Knudsvig's short position because she was a good customer, she
had indicated that she was replacing the certificate, and
Johnson thought that he was acting in Knudsvig's best
interest. Western's eventual buy-in resulted in a $5,402.20
deficit in Knudsvig's account, which is the basis for Western's
complaint.
In its memorandum decision, entered on October 23, 1986,
the trial court found that Knudsvig continued to be the owner
of the stock, that the alleged sale never occurred, and that
Western's activity was unconscionable. The trial court
dismissed Western's complaint and awarded punitive damages to
Knudsvig in the amount of $10,000.
Appellant asserts that the trial court erred: (1) in
finding that Knudsvig did not authorize the sale of her stock;
(2) in finding that Western violated Rules 10b-5 and 10b-10 of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; (3) in finding that
Western violated various National Association of Securities
Dealers (NASD) rules, and in finding that there is a private
right of action for violation of NASD rules; and (4) in
awarding punitive damages.
The trial court's findings of fact will not be disturbed on
appeal unless they "are against the clear weight of the
evidence, or if the appellate court otherwise reaches a
1. At the time of the trial, October 16, 1986, the value of
the stock was approximately $30.00 per share.
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definite and firm conviction tbit •* mistake has been made."
State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987); see also Cove
View Excavating & Const, Co. v. Flvnn, 758 P.2d 474, 477' (Utah
Ct. App. 1988). Factual findings are given considerable
deference because of the trial court's ability to assess ; .v.'itnesses's credibility. Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a); Power Systems,
97 Utah Adv, Rep, at 3b; Southland Corp, v. Potter, 760 P ?:]
120, 321 (Utah Ct, App 1988). Findings of fact are cleaiiv
erroneous, if the appellant can show that the/ are without.
adequate evidentiary foundation i: if they are- induced by A:I
erroneous view of the law. Ft ate v. Walker,
* '• •-! - *-'
(Utah 1987)
~u carefully examining the record, we nc, . ^nat LU
much conflicting evidence and inconsistent testimony,
especially regarding Knudsvig's telephone CE.11
Western, m
which Knudsvig purportedly authorized the sale of her st<" "•
and regarding whether or not Knudsvig received written
confirmation of the alleged sale from Western. The trial court
found that Knudsvig had no intention of selling her stock, thr?t
she was the rightful owner of the 20,000 shares of Venture
stock, and that Western failed to establish by a preponderance
of the evidence, that written notice of the transaction was
m a i 1 e n *; < K n u d s v *. - u. v.!^u,„:w

---estern ax.yae<

_hat - h e t r i a l

court

should

nave

believed its evidence rather than Knudsvig's. However, lhe
clear w e i g h t of the evidence supports the trial courtsfindings that the sale w a s not authorized and did not t a n ^
place, and we defer to the trial court's advantaged position ii I
evaluating the w i t n e s s e s ' s demeanor and credibility. W e find
no error i •• * H<> h u r t ' s rulings on this issue.2
JURISDICTION
Western asserts that the tridi i^-ax.. j a e d in Luioj. , . .^t
* iPtoH y,io, "!r»i^-5 and 10b-10 of tne Securities Exchange
2. A l t h o u g h Knudsvig raises affirmative defenses to W e s t e r n 1 s
action under Utah C o d e A n n . § - 7 0A-8-301, the Securities
Exchange A c t of ^ ^ 4 § 10b-10, and § 12 of the N A S D m a n u a l , we
do not considei u :em because: (1) we sustain the trial court's
finding that no bile of the securities occurred, thus obviating
the need for - defense to the ;;aie; «.-.'" / 0 ) the ••••ffies did not
: aise the • f; ;-;;:••-. f>n a p p e a l .
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Act of 1934 and various NASD rules. Before we examine the
merits of this argument, however, we raise sua sponte the issue
of subject matter jurisdiction over this claim. -.As stated in
Carreathers v. Carreathers, 654 P.2d 871 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982),
[t]he parties have not raised the issue of
. .. • subject matter jurisdiction . . . in
the trial court or in this appeal.
However, the question of subject matter
jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of
an action without an assignment of error,
and an appellate court may decide a
question of subject matter jurisdiction
where it appears on the face of the record.
Id. at 871; see also Thompson v. Jackson, 743 P.2d 1230, 1232
(Utah Ct. App. 1987). Furthermore, "this Court may, on its own
motion, determine lack of jurisdiction." Bailey v. Sound Lab,
Inc., 694 P.2d 1043, 1044 (Utah 1984); see also State v.
Brandimart, 720 P.2d 1009, 1010 (Haw. 1986). "Jurisdiction
cannot be conferred upon this Court by stipulation" of the
parties. Bailey, 649 P.2d at 1044.
Exclusive jurisdiction over causes of action stemming from
violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is vested in
the federal courts. The 1934 Act, at 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1981),
states in relevant part:
The district courts of the United States
. . . shall have exclusive jurisdiction of
violations of this chapter or the rules
and regulations thereunder. . . . Any
suit or action to enforce any liability or
duty created by this chapter or rules and
regulations thereunder . . . may be
brought in any such district or in the
district wherein the defendant is found or
is an inhabitant . . . .
Federal courts generally interpret this statute to mean what it
says: federal jurisdiction is exclusive over actions brought
to enforce the 1934 Act. See, e.g., Securities Investor
Protection Corp. v. Vigman, 764 F.2d 1309, 1313 (9th Cir.
1985); DeHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 1223, 1231
(10th Cir. 1971); Alkoff v. Gold, 611 F. Supp. 63, 66 (S.D.N.Y.
1985); Kinsev v. Nestor Exploration Ltd,—1981A, 604 F. Supp.
1365, 1368-69 (E.D. Wash. 1985); Fradkin v. Ernst, 571 F. Supp.
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R:.-) . .19 (N.I), Ohio 1 9 8 3 ) ; K l e c k l e y v . H e L e r t ,
i
. H-. App, *'spr*

: -

There is a split in authority as to whether the iyj4 hiA,
can be used as an affirmative defense in state actions. Some
jurisdictions assert that state courts do not. have jurisdiction
to adjudicate federal securities law questions brought under
the 1934 Act/ even when raised as an affirmative defense.
Instead, they "squarely endorse1* the proposition that " [w]here
exclusive jurisdiction exists, only-the federal courts can
provide affirmative relief.'1 Alkoff, 611 F. Supp. at 66
(Quoting L e w v. Lewis, 635 F.2d 960, 967 "(2nd Cir. 1980)),
While recognizing inai the statute'precludes state court
adjudication of direct claims based upon the violation of the
1934 Act, other jurisdictions all ow state courts to consider
claims based on the 1934 Act which are raised as affirmative
defenses in state court actions. Andrea Theatres, Inc. v.
Theatre Confections, Inc., 787 F.2d 59, 63 (2nd Cir, 1986);
Scope Indus, v. Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, 576 F.
Supp. 373, 379 ( C D . Cal. 1983); Birenbaum v.- Bache & Co., 555
S,W.2d 513, 514-15 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977).
•ven so. tnejt jm. i^icdons do not allow state courts to
grar/w affirmative relief to a defendant who prevails on such
federal claims, h-u , instead, force the defendant to go to
federal court to seek affirmative relief
Andrea Theatres, 787
F.2d at 63. Further, these jurisdiction!:; distinguish between
"cases," wherein state determination is precluded, and
"questions/11 v;<--ich the state may adjudicate, which arise under
the 1934 Act. Scope Indus, , 576 F. Supp. at; 378-79; Birenbaum,
555 S-W*2d at 515. The Birenbaum court adopted the United
States Supreme Court's reasoning regardi'-'r inr^di'^inri r.ver
patent claim0 '- -r;*i<:; ••.-; t-his distinct!-^
There is d clear aistinctioi
case and a question arising ^
patent laws. The former arises when the
plaintiff in his opening pleading—be it a
bill, ^omnlaint, or declaration—-sets up a
right .*:.Jer the patent laws as ground for
a recovery.. n* such the state courts have
no jurisdiction. The latter may appear in
the plea or answer or in the vestimony.
The determination of such question i s not
beyond the compet" w,"y ' r ''hr* fate
tribunals.
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Birenbaum, 555 S.W.2d at 515 (quoting Pratt v. Paris Gaslight &
Coke Co., 168 U.S. 255, 259 (1897) (emphasis in Birenbaum).
The Birenbaum court found that the state court was competent to
adjudicate a 10b-5 violation issue because it Honly appeared by
way of defense, it is merely a question in the case, rather
than a claim for relief.** Birenbaum, 555 S.W.2d at 515.
Similarly, the Scope Industries court, in determining that
the state court had jurisdiction to consider a defense based on
the 1934 Act, also distinguished between cases, which the state
court could not adjudicate, and questions, which the state
court was competent to consider. It stated that whether a
"colorable claim existed under the Exchange Act at the
commencement of the underlying action is different in kind than
the question of whether or not Scope violated the Exchange Act,
as alleged in the underlying action.1* Scope Indus. , 756 F.
Supp. at 378-79.
We do not find it necessary today to decide which of these
lines of cases we will follow. Although Knudsvig asserted Rule
10b-10 as an affirmative defense, her claims under the 1934 Act
were brought in the form of a counterclaim for violation of
Rule 10b-5 as well as Rule 10b-10. Thus, even under the more
liberal authority, she does not qualify jurisdictionally.
These claims are in the nature of a case rather than a question
and, accordingly, we do not have jurisdiction to consider them.
VIOLATION OF NASD RULES
Section 15A(b)(6) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(6) (1981), requires securities
associations, such as the NASD, to adopt disciplinary rules.
See Emmons v. Merrill, Lvnch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 532
F. Supp. 480, 483 (S.D. Ohio 1982). Section 15 U.S.C. § 78s(g)
requires that M[e]very self-regulatory organization shall
comply with the provisions of this chapter, the rules and
regulations thereunder, and its own rules." Thus, the NASD
comes under the regulatory provisions of the Act and is subject
to the exclusive jurisdiction provision of 15 U.S.C. § 78o(a).
Therefore, any action based on violation of NASD rules must be
brought in the federal courts.
That Knudsvig1s counterclaim may be construed to be
compulsory under Utah R. Civ. P. 13(a) still does not confer
jurisdiction upon this Court to hear the merits of her claim.
"A party is not required to file a compulsory counterclaim in
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the district -a-ui t if the claii n exceed;, t,:. < n i i sdict ion o:
that court." Brewer v, Bradley, 431 So. 2d 544, 545 (Ala. * •• •
App. ' ^ ^ 3
o summarize, Knu^.-u - • ouuturcji ;olies exclusively
upon alleged violations of the 1934 Act and NASD rules, which
are regulated under the 1934 Act, all of which come under
exclusive federal jurisdiction. Once we have determined that
we have no jurisdiction over a claim, all we T**V do is dismiss
the action. See In re Marriage of Passiales, -!<» ill, App* 3d
629, 494 N.E.2d 541, 547, 98 111. Dec. 419 (1986); Wells v.
Noldon, 679 S.W.2d 889, 891 (Mo. Ct, V r
1984"
• ^ref^rdismiss Knudsvig"'1 s entire cou.nterclf: a. *..
PUNITIVE DAMAGEb
The \.LHXX ^,„._ oismissed Western's complaint and, even
though the court failed to find any actual damages stemming
from the a'1/nged violations of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 in Kn
vlg's counterclaim i* awarded punitive damages to
Knudsvig,
. ;ice we h<:,v* found that the trial court had no
jurisdiction to hear \ht- counterclaim, it follows that
Knudsvig* s associate-! s -.'jMest for damages fails. See Howard v.
Miller, 108 xil. Api . ..4<8 N.E.2d 680, 685, 63 111. Dec,
749 (1982); see also DeWitt County Pub, Bldq. Comm'n v. County
of DeWitt, 128 111. App. 3d 11, 469 N.E.2d 689, 694, 83 111.
Dec. 82 (1984). . Further, Ma court without jurisdiction «:annr*.
order affirmative relief." Chadwick v. Pillard, 536 F. Supp
7?, 75 (E.D. Tenn. 1982). Therefore, the trial couri -" f** punitive damages.

3. Federal practice is similar: If a federal court has
jurisdiction over a plaintiff's clai::;, it will also have
jurisdiction over a counterclaim arising from the same actir<y
occurrence. However, "if the counterclaim is entirel;
beyond the competence of the federal courts, as for exampitaction precluded by sovereign immunity or one involving a
purely probate matter, the court may not adjudicate it even ..
the claim would otherwise be treated as compulsory." W:igh4
y'- 11 *• r, Federal Practice & Procedure,
' • ^ •* .•'- *"• f ]Q~*' -
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We af£ij^n t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s d i s m i s s a l of W e s t e r n ' s
compLsrlTnt: b u t r e v e r s , e i t s ^ # ? a r d of p u n i t i v e d a m a g e s .

R e g n a l 1*L G a r f f ,

Judge

WE CONCUR:

J*k&$C J77-

SU&k^D

Judith M. Billings, Judge

Norman H. Jackson,^oudge
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